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ABSTRACT: The introduction of Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS)  has dispro- 
portionately increased financial pressures on rural hospitals and posed challenges to the 
survival of these institutions. Increasingly, rural hospitals are seeking strategies that can 
enhance their chances for survival in a turbulent and hostile environment. This study examined 
the survival effects of one such strategy, multihospital system affiliation. Specifically, we 
assessed: (1) whether and how different types of system affiliation in the post-PPS era affect the 
likelihood of rural hospital survival; (2)  whether particular structural, environmental and 
hospital performance characteristics moderate the effects of system affiliation on rural hospital 
survival; and (3)  whether Systematic selection by rural hospitals into multihospital systems 
potentially accounts for observed relationships between system affiliation and survival. 
Proportional hazards analyses indicate that system affiliation with investor-owned systems 
significantly reduces survival probabilities of rural hospitals. Affiliation with not-for-profit 
systems or system affiliation under contract management arrangements does not affect survival 
probabilities of rural hospitals. 
These general findings are moderated by the effects of hospital ownership and size at the 
time of affiliation. Finally, study findings indicated that systematic selection by poor performing 
rural hospitals into investor-owned systems has occurred in the post-PPS era. No evidence of 
selection into not-for-profit systems was discovered. 
he economic changes created by 
Medicare's Prospective Payment System 
(PPS) have posed a threat to the survival 
of rural hospitals. Rural hospitals serve 
disproportionately more patients in 
urban hospitals for the same procedures due to 
urban/ruraI payment differentials (Moscovice, 1989). 
Problems posed by PI'S in rural areas have been 
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categories affected bv this change, including 
indgents and the elderly (Hart,-Amundson, & 
Rosenblatt, 1990; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ,  1989). 
hospitals often receive lower reimbursements than 
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exacerbated by other economic challenges to rural 
hospitals, including decreased revenues, increased 
liability concerns, loss of patients to urban facilities, 
shortage of capital, and declining operating margins 
(Government Accounting Office, 1990; Mick & 
Morlock, 1990). 
As rural hospitals are being challenged by PPS 
and other concomitant environmental changes, many 
are considering available strategic options that can 
potentially enhance their chances for survival. This 
study examined whether the strategy of multihospital 
system affiliation in the post-PI'S environment affects 
the survival probabilities of rural hospitals. Specifi- 
cally, we investigated three issues: (1) whether and 
how different types of multihospital system affilia- 
tion affect the likelihood of rural hospital survival; (2) 
whether structural, environmental, and performance 
characteristics of hospitals moderate the effects of 
multihospital system affiliation on rural hospital 
survival; and (3) whether systematic selection by 
rural hospitals into multihospital systems potentially 
accounts for observed relationships between system 
affiliation and survival. 
Background -
Multihospital System Strategies. Although 
studies of hospital closure have been abundant 
(Cannedy, Pointer, & Ruchlin, 1973; Kennedy & 
Dumas, 1983; Mayer, Kohlenberg, Sieferman, & 
Rosenblatt, 1987; Muller & Whiteis, 1988; Mullner, 
Rydman, Whiteis, & Rich, 1989; Mullner & McNeil, 
1986), relatively few have examined the effects of 
multihospital system affiliation on rural hospital 
viability and survival. Those that have generally 
report mixed findings. Longo and Chase (1984), in 
examining closure of all hospitals, compared hospi- 
tals that closed to hospitals that merged with one or 
more hospitals, joined a multihospital system, or 
remained open and autonomous. They found that the 
characteristics of hospitals that closed resembled 
those of hospitals that became part of mergers, while 
the characteristics of hospitals that affiliated with 
multihospital systems resembled those that remained 
open and autonomous. Additional multivariate 
analyses were performed to examine the independent 
effect of a number of factors on hospital closure, but 
system affiliation was not among them. 
Mullner et al. (1989) specifically examined the 
effect of system affiliation on rural hospital closure. 
Affiliation with a multihospital system was found to 
be protective for rural hospitals in two ownership 
categories: investor owned and voluntary non-profit. 
Finally, a recent study by Barry, Tucker, and Seavey 
(1990) found that system affiliation by rural hospitals 
affected hospital performance only as measured by 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO) accreditation. System 
hospitals were more likely to receive accreditation 
than were those that were not system affiliated. No 
other performance measures showed a significant 
difference between affiliated and independent 
hospitals. 
At least four theoretical and research design 
issues limit the utility of these studies. First, previous 
studies of multihospital system affiliation by rural 
hospitals have not separated hospitals by type of 
system affiliation. To the extent that acquisition and 
operating strategies differ across systems, affiliation 
with different types of systems can potentially have 
very different effects on the likelihood of rural 
hospital survival (Alexander & Morrisey, 1988,1989). 
hospital closure can only examine closures that occur 
within a delineated period; by definition, closures 
that occur after the study period cannot be known or 
predicted with certainty. In previous studies, hospi- 
tals that remained open through the end of a study 
period have typically been treated as not closing. In 
reality, however, some or all of these hospitals may 
close at some point in the future. Ignoring the effect 
of such right censored observations can lead to 
seriously biased estimates when modeling the 
occurrence of organizational "events" such as closure. 
Third is the issue of time dependence. Within a 
study period, dynamic events such as system affilia- 
tion do not occur at the same time for all hospitals 
under study. Some hospitals may affiliate early in the 
study period, while others affiliate later. The effect of 
system affiliation can be studied for longer durations 
for hospitals that affiliate early in the study period, 
while the effect of affiliation may not be detectable for 
hospitals joining systems near the end of the study. 
Models that do not take this temporal variation into 
account are, in effect, evaluating the effect of affilia- 
tion on survival uniformly from a single point in the 
study period. 
A fourth issue involves specification of the 
conditions under which system affiliation would be 
appropriate for rural hospitals. Advantages (or 
disadvantages) of system affiliation may be moder- 
ated by economic, structural, and environmental 
conditions present at the time of affiliation. Ignoring 
Second is the issue of right censoring. Studies of 
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such potential moderating effects may lead to inap- 
propriate strategic action for significant subsets of 
rural hospitals. As discussed by Smith and Piland 
(1 990>, "rural hospitals must evaluate the applicabil- 
ity of strategies in light of their particular environ- 
mental and organizational structures." 
Hypotheses. A strategy frequently advocated by 
many hospital experts to improve the financial 
viability and survival of rural institutions is linkage 
with a larger health care or hospital system (MHS). 
The touted benefits of MHS affiliation include 
economies of scale related to joint purchasing or 
shared service agreements; operating efficiencies in 
the form of increased productivity, lower staffing 
requirements, and lower per unit costs; and im- 
proved access to capital financing (Zuckerman, 1979; 
Ermann & Gabel, 1984). 
Research evidence regarding the benefits of such 
affiliation, however, is decidedly mixed (Ermann & 
Gabe, 1984, Shortell, 1988). Indeed, a frequent but 
questionable assumption of studies on multihospital 
system performance has been that hospitals affiliating 
with different systems benefit from similar operating 
advantages. However, systems may vary on a 
number of important dimensions, including locus of 
control (Alexander & Fennell, 1986), acquisition 
criteria (Alexander & Morrisey, 1988; Alexander et 
al., 1985), and operating strategies (IOM, 1986; 
Ermann & Gabel, 1984; Shortell, 1988). The latter may 
include growth, scale economies, the attainment of 
monopoly power, or market penetration (Morrisey & 
Alexander, 1987). Such strategic differences have 
been systematically linked with three types of 
multihospital system arrangements: not-for-profit 
multihospital systems, investor-owned multihospital 
systems, and contract management arrangements 
(Alexander & Morrisey, 1988; Morrisey & Alexander, 
1987). Because of differences in operating strategies 
among these three types of system arrangements, the 
survival chances of rural hospitals affiliating with 
each of the three types may also differ. 
considering the acquisition of a rural hospital must 
look at the same market and management factors. 
Ideally, these would be situations in which the 
opportunities to improve hospital performance 
would be bolstered by favorable market conditions 
and weak current management structure. Not-for- 
profit systems, however, may be willing to relax 
some of these criteria because their strategic goals 
may include those other than profit. That is, not-for- 
Both not-for-profit and investor-owned systems 
profit systems may be more likely to acquire hospi- 
tals in poor market situations. At the same time, not- 
for-profit systems relative to investor-owned systems 
may be less likely to divest themselves of marginal 
hospitals because of institutional constraints 
(Alexander & Morrisey, 1988). By contrast, the 
fiduciary obligations of investor-owned systems to 
their stockholders may compel them to quickly 
withdraw support from a failing rural hospital if it 
cannot be turned around or if the system changes its 
strategic direction. Such actions are facilitated by the 
relatively weak links between investor-owned 
facilities and community and government interests 
(Rose, 1983). Thus, all things being equal, risk of 
closure will be lowered by rural hospital affiliation 
with not-for-profit systems, but will increase through 
affiliation with investor-owned systems by virtue of 
the more rigorous market criteria applied by such 
systems (e.g., profitability) coupled with weaker 
community support. 
eses. 
These arguments lead to the following hypoth- 
Hypothesis 1. Ceteris puribus, rural hospi- 
tals affiliating with investor-owned systems 
in the post-PPS era experience higher risk of 
closure than rural hospitals that did not 
affiliate with investor-owned systems. 
tals affiliating with not-for-profit 
multihospital systems in the post PPS era 
experience lower risk of closure than rural 
hospitals that did not affiliate with not-for- 
profit multihospital systems. 
Contract management is a third form of system 
affiliation, characterized by a situation in which the 
governing board of a hospital assigns the duties of 
managing the day-to-day operations of the institution 
to an organization other than the hospital. The board 
retains full control over hospital policy. Much of the 
literature views contract management as a means by 
which hospitals can acquire depth in management 
expertise and experience without sacrificing institu- 
tional autonomy and independence. From the 
system's perspective, however, management con- 
tracts may be undesirable because the system cannot 
exercise enough control over the operations of the 
managed hospital (Morrisey & Alexander, 1987; 
Alexander, & Morrisey 1989). Because of these severe 
operating constraints, we expect that externally 
provided management expertise will not be sufficient 
to extricate distressed rural hospitals from their 
predicament. Therefore, we anticipate that contract 
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris purubis, rural hospi- 
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management will be ineffective as a strategy for 
lowering the risk of rural hospital failure. 
esis. 
We therefore formulated the following hypoth- 
Hypothesis 3. Ceteris paribus, rural hospi- 
tals affiliating with multihospital systems 
through contract management in the post- 
PPS era experience no difference in risk of 
closure relative to rural hospitals that did not 
affiliate with multihospital systems through 
contract management. 
To this point, our theoretical discussion has 
focused on general survival benefits of system 
affiliation by rural hospitals under PPS. A second 
related issue concerns the joint effects of system 
affiliation and hospital characteristics on survival 
chances for rural hospitals. That is, does system 
affiliation affect survival probabilities differentially as 
a function of type of hospital or conditions of affilia- 
tion? For example, it may be beyond the management 
capabilities of systems to improve the survival 
probabilities for very small, poorly performing rural 
hospital affiliates. On the other hand, the risk of 
failure may be significantly reduced for smaller, more 
vulnerable hospitals that affiliate with systems, since 
they have the most to gain from such affiliation. After 
testing the main effects models, we explore whether 
such predisposing hospital characteristics mediate 
the effects of system affiliation on hospital survival. 
Covariates. In examining the relationship of rural 
hospital survival and multihospital system affiliation, 
a number of additional covariates are considered. 
These variables will be employed both as control 
variables to rule out alternative explanations for the 
relationship between system affiliation and rural 
hospital survival and to test the hypothesis that 
hospital predisposing characteristics mediate this 
relationship. 
have greater likelihoods of survival. Barry, Tucker, 
and Seavey (1990) reported that larger rural hospitals 
(50 to 100 beds, as compared to rural hospitals with 
fewer than 50 beds) were more likely to have higher 
occupancy rates, longer average length of stays, 
fewer employees per bed, and were more likely to be 
accredited. Moscovice (1989) also reported that the 
smallest rural hospitals are the least profitable and 
the most likely to have negative operating margins. 
Because these factors can directly affect rural hospital 
survival, we control for such effects by including a 
Size. The literature suggests that larger hospitals 
variable reflecting the number of beds operated by the 
hospital. 
Sole provider status. When only a single hospital 
exists within a rural community, there may be addi- 
tional incentives for such a hospital to remain in 
operation (e.g., community support, strong institu- 
tional ties). Further, under PPS, additional support is 
available for sole community hospitals (Moscovice, 
1989). These factors may be offset, however, since sole 
providers are generally smaller than other rural 
hospitals and have higher average costs (Moscovice, 
1989). We therefore control for hospitals operating as 
the sole health care provider within a given market 
area. 
Ownership. Because rural hospitals of different 
ownership (governmental, religious, secular not-for- 
profit, or investor owned) may have differing underly- 
ing missions, operating strategies, and/or predisposi- 
tions to affiliate with (or be acquired by) multihospital 
systems, we control for the effect of hospital owner- 
ship on rural hospital survival. 
Prior system uffiZiution. Accounting for hospital 
affiliation with multihospital systems prior to the start 
of the study period (1983) is necessary to accurately 
reflect the risks of both new system affiliations within 
the study period and to differentiate between those 
hospitals that engaged in system affiliation in response 
to PPS from those that affiliated earlier. We therefore 
control for extant system membership at the start of 
the study period (1983). 
Performance stage. A hospital's long-term operating 
performance has a direct influence on its continued 
survival. Further, such performance may be important 
in systematic selection of rural hospitals into 
multihospital systems, as discussed above. We there- 
fore control for hospital performance stage, a variable 
indicating whether the hospital is in a period of 
growth, decline, stability, or instability. 
Methods - 
Sample and Data. Data were collected from the 
American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual 
Surveys of Hospitals, years 1983 through 1988. The 
AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals is administered in 
the fourth quarter of each year to all AHA registered 
and non-registered facilities (N=6,800). Except for 
minor modifications, the survey remained unchanged 
throughout the study period. Data were also derived 
from the AHA Multihospital System Directory and 
other published and unpublished sources. 
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The sample used for the current study was a 
panel of 2705 community hospitals that were: (1) in 
operation in 1983, and (2) located in rural areas, 
designated as operating outside of a Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (Note 1). 
Measurement. 
Hospital closure. The dependent variable for this 
study is based on whether or not hospital closure 
occurred in each year from 1984 to 1988. This variable 
was derived from the Deletions section of the AHA 
Summary of Registered Hospitals and validated by 
independent lists produced by the AHA. In addition 
to complete cessation of operations, the AHA defini- 
tion of closure includes shifts by hospitals from 
providing acute inpatient care to either another form 
of inpatient care (i.e., residential care), outpatient care 
only, or non-health care services. Partial conversion is 
not considered closure as long as the hospital contin- 
ues to provide some acute inpatient care (Note 1). 
Independent variables. Six variables were con- 
structed to model the relationship between 
multihospital system affiliation and rural hospital 
survival. 
1. Multihospital system affiliation. 
Information on system affiliation was pre- 
pared by comparing consecutive years (in the 
study period) of the AHA Multihospital System 
Directory. Changes in status of individual 
hospitals with respect to system affiliation and 
additions to systems were identified. Three 
, different classes of affiliation were examined: 
membership in a not-for-profit system in an 
owned, leased, or sponsored capacity; member- 
ship in an investor-owned system in an owned, 
leased, or sponsored capacity; and contract 
management by a system of any ownership 
status. System affiliation was coded as a time- 
dependent variable, recording not only the type 
of affiliation (if any) occurring within the study 
period, but also the year within the study period 
when the affiliation took place. Thus, for each 
class of system affiliation, two variables were 
created: one dichotomous variable indicating 
affiliation (1) or no affiliation (0) within the six 
years of the study period (1983-88), and the 
second variable indicating during which year (if 
any) of the study the affiliation occurred (Note 2). 
Prior (pre-1983) affiliation with investor- 
2. Prior system affiliation. 
owned, not-for-profit, or contract management 
was coded as separate dichotomous variables: 
prior affiliation (0) versus no prior affiliation (1). 
This information was derived from the 1983 AHA 
survey. 
3. Hospital Size. 
Size was measured as the number of hospital 
statistical beds, as recorded by the 1983 AHA 
survey. Statistical beds refers to ”the average 
number of beds set up and staffed for use during 
the reporting period.” 
4. Sole Provider Status. 
Hospitals were designated as sole providers 
if no other general acute care hospital operated 
within a 15-mile radius. This information was 
derived from the Hospital Neighbor File (Luft & 
Maerki, 1985). The sole provider variable status 
was coded dichotomously, sole provider (1) 
versus not a sole provider (0). 
5. Hospital Ownership. 
Ownership was derived from the 1983 AHA 
survey. All hospitals were placed in one of four 
mutually exclusive ownership categories: govern- 
ment, religious, secular not-for-profit, or investor 
owned. Secular not-for-profit hospitals was the 
omitted reference category in multivariate 
analyses. 
6. Performance Stage. 
Following Cameron and colleagues 
(Cameron, Kim, & Whetten, 1987a; Cameron, 
Whetten, & Kim, 198%; Whetten, 1987), hospitals 
were placed into one of four mutually exclusive 
performance stages for the period 1980-1984: 
decliners, growers, stable, or unstable. Perfor- 
mance cycle was determined by patterns of 
adjusted admissions of hospitals in the sample, 
where adjusted admissions are the sums of 
admissions and equivalent admissions attributed 
to outpatient services (product of admissions and 
ratio of outpatient revenue to inpatient revenue). 
Patterns of changes in adjusted admissions of an 
individual hospital were compared to mean 
changes for that hospital’s industry comparison 
group. Nine mutually exclusive comparison 
groups were formed on the basis of ownership 
category (secular not-for-profit, religious not-for- 
profit, or government), and within each owner- 
ship category, three groups were formed based 
on hospital bed size (fewer than 100 beds, be- 
tween 100-299 beds, 300 or more beds). Hospitals 
showing increases in adjusted admissions of 
more than 5 percent above the average change for 
their comparison groups for at least three of the 
four consecutive years pairs (1980-81,81-82,82- 
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83,83-84) were categorized as growers, while 
those showing decreases of more than 5 percent 
below national averages for at least three of four 
year pairs were designated as decliners. Hospi- 
tals showing at least one year pair of consecutive 
years with adjusted admissions growth greater 
than 5 percent and at least one year pair of 
adjusted admissions decline greater than 5 
percent with respect to their comparison groups 
were classified as unstable. All remaining hospi- 
tals were classified as stable. Numbers of ad- 
justed admissions for this time period were taken 
from the 1980-1984 AHA Annual Survey of 
Hospitals. 
Analytic method. Models were evaluated using 
proportional hazards regression (Cox, 1972). This is a 
semi-parametric technique where the underlying 
baseline risk (here, the baseline risk of rural hospital 
closure), also known as the hazard, is an unspecified 
function of time. Risk of closure for any hospital is 
proportional to this baseline risk, and the exact level 
of risk depends on the hospital’s covariates. The 
relative risk of closure with certain covariates or 
covariate combinations can thus be determined. 
ables (Allison, 1985). The first is an event variable, to 
indicate whether the activity under study (here, 
multihospital system affiliation by a rural hospital) 
has occurred. The second is a censoring variable. This 
variable is needed, as discussed above, because this 
analysis ends before all the hospitals involved in the 
analysis close. Given an infinite amount of time to 
observe rural hospitals in this study, all hospitals 
would eventually close. However, as a study of 
infinite duration is not feasible, the number of years a 
given hospital has been observed and the number of 
hospitals that close during these years suggests the 
rate at which other hospitals in the study will eventu- 
ally close. 
The hazard rate for rural hospital closure was 
measured by estimating the following model: 
Proportional hazards models involve two vari- 
rjk(t) = exp (gjkX(t)) 
where r,k is the rate of transition from state j (opera- 
tional) to state k (closed), X(t) is a vector of covariate 
values at time t, and gjk is a vector of parameter 
estimates determined by partial likelihood estima- 
tion. Transition rates are postulated to be log linear 
functions of the variables in vector X. 
The time-dependent nature of multihospital 
system affiliation is incorporated into the propor- 
tional hazards regression by setting the affiliation 
variable initially to zero. The affiliation variable is re- 
valued to one in the year in which an affiliation took 
place. If multihospital affiliation does not occur 
during the study period, the affiliation variable 
remains zero throughout the regression. 
Results - 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among 
study variables are shown in Table 1. Negative 
correlations with large magnitudes were found 
between variables representing different classes of a 
categorical variable (i.e., between the different types 
of hospital ownership). These large negative correla- 
tions, however, were not unexpected. 
affiliations and closure among rural hospitals during 
the study period. Yearly closure of rural hospitals 
generally increased throughout the study period. 
Overall, approximately 5.9 percent of the study 
sample closed between 1983 and 1988. Of the three 
types of multihospital system affiliation examined, 
contract management was the most frequently 
observed, occurring in approximately 12 percent of 
the study panel. Affiliation with investor-owned or 
not-for-profit systems occurred less often but with 
similar frequency (4.8% and 5.7%, respectively). With 
one exception, strong temporal patterns were not 
evident among or between any of the three affiliation 
types. Considerably fewer hospitals affiliated with 
investor-owned and not-for-profit systems in the final 
year of the study period (1988) than might be ex- 
pected from extrapolating trends from the preceding 
years. This may be due to several factors, including 
shifts in system strategies away from horizontal 
integration, a reduced pool of “acceptable” acquisi- 
tion candidates among rural hospitals, and/or 
perceived lack of efficacy of system affiliation by 
rural hospitals. 
main effects of multihospital system affiliation, 
hospital size, sole provider status, prior system 
affiliation, hospital ownership, and performance 
stage on the probability of rural hospital survival. 
The model was estimated separately for each of the 
three system affiliation types: affiliation with not-for- 
profit systems, affiliation with investor-owned 
systems, or contract management. The three system 
types are estimated separately because of previous 
Table 2 presents the temporal pattern of system 
A single base model was specified to examine the 
The luurnal of Rural Health 98 Vul. 8, Nu. 2 
Table 1. Intercorrelations and Descriptive Statistics. 














Hospital closure 0.06 0.23 
Statistical beds 84.71 67.61 
Sole provider status 0.48 0.49 
1983 M H 9  affliation 0.16 0.37 
1983 CM3 affiliation 0.16 0.36 
Government ownership 0.45 0.50 
Investor ownership 0.09 0.28 
Religious ownership 0.08 0.26 
Secular NFP4 ownership 0.39 0.49 
Decliner 0.06 0.24 
Grower 0.10 0.30 
Stable 0.34 0.47 


































-0.01 -0.26 -0.09 
0.13 -0.72 -0.25 -0.23 
0.00 -0.04 0.11 0.01 -0.04 
0.05 0.09 -0.09 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 
-0.10 -0.05 0.03 -0.00 0.03 -0.18 -0.24 
0.07 0.03 -0.05 -0.00 0.01 -0.27 -0.11 -0.77 
Correlations greater than or equal to 0.04 are statistically signficant at P=0.05. 
1. SD=Standard Deviation 
2. MHS=Multihospital System 
3. CM=Contract Management 
4. NFP=Not-for-profit 
evidence that each is potentially distinct with regard 
to its operating or acquisition strategy (Alexander & 
Morrisey, 1989). Collinearity diagnostics were 
performed separately for each system affiliation 
model using the method described by Belsley, Kuh, 
and Welsch (1980). These diagnostics suggest that no 
significant collinearity occurs in any of the three 
models. 
models. The positive beta coefficients for the system 
affiliation variables in the three models indicate that 
system affiliation decreased the likelihood of rural 
hospital survival (e.g., increased likelihood of clo- 
sure) for each of the three types of affiliation exam- 
ined. However, only affiliation with investor-owned 
systems was statistically significant. In support of 
hypothesis 1, this finding indicates that joining an 
Table 3 presents results from the aforementioned 
Table 2. Multihospital System Affiliations and 
Closures Among Rural Hospitals, by Year 












7 39 -1 
17 44 26 
36 79 20 
46 54 33 
34 51 39 
13 60 41 
Total 129 153 327 159 
investor-owned multihospital system in the post-PPS 
era significantly reduced the probability of survival 
for rural hospitals relative to nonjoiners. This result 
obtains controlling for performance stage, ownership, 
1. Because the study group was defined as rural hospitals in 
operation during 1983, no hospital that closed in 1983 was 
included in the study. 
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Table 3. Proportional Hazard Regression 




Owned NFPI Management 
betaL-se betakse betakse 
(hazard (hazard (hazard 
Covariate ratio) ratio) ratio) 
System affiliation2 
Size -0.020.00*** 
Sole provider status 
System affiliaion 





































































N 2,705 2,705 2,705 
Likelihood ratio 206.68*** 185.88*** 185.47*** 





System affiliation coded as a time-varying, dichotomous 
variable. 
Statistical significance of betas is represented as follows: 
* k 0 . 0 5  
** P<O.Ol 
*** P<O.OOl 
Hazard ratios are the percentage change in risk of closure for 
a variable taking on the value of one as compared to the 
variable being zero. For the hospital size variable, the hazard 
ratio of 0.98 indicates that the risk of closure for a hospital of 
N+1 beds has 98 percent of the risk of closure as a hospital of 
N beds. 
4. 
sole provider status, hospital size, and prior affilia- 
tion with an investor-owned system. Hypothesis 2 
predicted that survival probabilities would increase 
for those rural hospitals affiliating with not-for-profit 
systems in the post-PPS era. Our results do not 
support this prediction. Statistically, survival chances 
of affiliators and nonaffiliators with not-for-profit 
systems are similar. Finally, we found support for 
hypothesis 3 in that no statistically significant differ- 
ences in survival probability obtained between 
contract management joiners and nonjoiners. As a 
rural hospital survival strategy, system affiliation 
appears to be, at best, ineffective in the case of not- 
for-profit systems or contract management arrange- 
ments and, at worst, detrimental if hospitals affiliate 
with investor-owned systems. 
Hospital size significantly increased the likeli- 
hood of rural hospital survival in each of the three 
models. The negative regression coefficients for the 
size variables reflect decreased likelihood of hospital 
closure. This finding is consistent with previous 
studies (Cannedy et al., 1973; Mullner & McNeil, 
1986) that found larger rural hospitals are less likely 
to close than small rural hospitals. Sole provider 
status also has a significant protective effect against 
rural hospital closure in each of the three models. 
Prior system affiliation or contract management, 
while in the direction of increasing likelihood of 
survival, was not significant for any of the three 
models. 
survival was assessed relative to the excluded 
category of secular not-for-profit ownership. The 
effects of hospital ownership on survival probabilities 
differed slightly between the three base models. For 
each of the three models examined, government 
ownership significantly increased rural hospital 
survival probabilities, while religious ownership was 
associated with decreased survival probabilities, 
although the relationship was not statistically signifi- 
cant. Investor ownership also decreased the likeli- 
hood of rural hospital survival, but was statistically 
significant only for models examining affiliation with 
not-for-profit systems and contract management. 
Previous studies have reported that investor owner- 
ship increases the risk of rural hospital closure 
(Mayer et al., 1987). 
in comparison to the excluded category of stable 
performance stage. Declining performance stage 
decreased the likelihood of rural hospital survival 
significantly, while growing performance stage 
significantly increased survival likelihood. Unstable 
The effects of ownership type on rural hospital 
The effects of performance stage were examined 
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performance stage also increased survival probabili- 
ties of rural hospitals, but was not significant in the 
model. 
Two patterns are particularly notable in the 
aforementioned results. First, the direction of the 
coefficients for prior system affiliation (before 1983) 
are opposite those for post-PI'S affiliation with 
multihospital systems. Although these coefficients 
were not significant, they do suggest that the period 
during which hospitals affiliate with systems may 
affect survival risk among rural hospitals. It is 
possible, for example, that rural hospitals affiliating 
with systems after PPS were at greater risk for closure 
relative to those affiliating prior to the implementa- 
tion of PI'S. Whether this represents different pat- 
terns of selection in the post-PI'S era, shift in system 
acquisition strategies, or the possibility that tenure in 
system may increase survival probabilities cannot be 
definitively ascertained from our data. Second, in 
contrast to the findings of previous research, our 
results suggest that it is not investor ownership, per 
se, that affects risk of hospital closure. Instead, 
affiliation with investor-owned multihospital systems 
appears to be the critical determinant of closure risk. 
Moderating Effects on System Affiliation and 
Hospital Survival. Our second major research issue 
concerns whether or not various structural, environ- 
mental, or performance characteristics of hospitals 
have a moderating effect on the relationship between 
system affiliation and rural hospital closure. Our 
exploratory analysis of this issue focuses on testing 
for significant interaction effects between system 
affiliation and the following variables: hospital size, 
sole provider status, ownership, and performance 
stage. As before, we modeled the three affiliation 
strategies separately: investor-owned systems, not- 
for-profit systems, and contract management. 
Twenty-four different models were tested, each 
predicting closure as a function of the main effects 
presented in Table 3, plus one interaction term. Table 
4 presents only the coefficients for the interaction 
terms from those models (Note 3). 
For rural hospitals affiliating with investor- 
owned systems, larger hospitals have significantly 
decreased likelihoods of survival. This is noteworthy 
as the main effects of hospital size suggest that as 
hospital size increases, so do rural hospital survival 
probabilities. Another way of stating this finding is 
that larger rural hospitals that affiliate with investor- 
owned systems are at greater risk of closure than 
larger rural hospitals that do not so affiliate. Large 
size affords rural hospitals degrees of protection from 
Table 4. Moderated Effects of System Affiliation 
on Rural Hospital Closure'. 
System Affiliation 
Investor Contract 
Owned NFP2 Management 
betakse betakse betakse 
(hazard (hazard (hazard 
Covariate interactions ratio) ratio) ratio) 
System Affiliation x 
Size O.O2fO.Ol*3 0.02f0.01 -0.03f0.02' 
(1.02) (1.00) (0.97) 
Sole provider status 0.63k0.47 -0.04k0.89 0.35f0.63 
Hospital ownership: -1.02+0.57# 1.821.25 0.14k0.66 
government (0.36) (6.16) (1.16) 
Hospital ownership: -2.05k0.56*** 2.13+1.18# -0.68f1.12 
investor (0.13) (8.40) (0.50) 
(1.88) (0.96) (1.42) 
Hospital ownership: 0.14f1.13 -4 - 
religious (1.15) 
Decliner stage -1.2Sf0.71' 0.84k1.03 2.15f1.25' 
(0.29) (2.32) (8.58) 
Grower stage - - - 
Unstable stage 0.29k0.49 -0.3M1.02 1.82k1.08' 
(1.34) (0.74) (6.16) 
1. All moderating results shown were obtained by adding 
multiplicative interaction terms individually to full models 
specified in Table 3. 
2. NFP=Not-for-profit 





Missing values indicate an empty cell for an interaction with 
respect to the dependent variable (i.e., no hospitals under 
religious ownership, joined a not-for-profit system, and 
subsequently closed in the study period). 
4. 
closure that are lost when they join an investor- 
owned system. Hospitals under government or 
investor ownership that affiliate with investor-owned 
systems experienced significant increases in the 
likelihood of survival during the study period related 
to their nonaffiliating counterparts. Finally, relative to 
hospitals in stable performance cycles, declining 
hospitals that affiliate with investor-owned systems 
experience a reduced likelihood of closure. Although 
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this interaction was only significant at the P<O.lO 
level, it is noteworthy in light of the fact that the main 
effects of declining performance are associated with 
reduced survival probabilities for rural hospitals. 
This suggests that poorly performing hospitals 
joining investor-owned multihospital systems may 
improve their chances of survival relative to the 
option of not joining an investor-owned system. 
In general, mediating effects of hospital charac- 
teristics on the relationship of system affiliation and 
hospital survival were weaker in both the not-for- 
profit system and contract management models. In 
the not-for-profit system model, affiliation by a free- 
standing investor-owned hospital with a not-for- 
profit system reduced the survival probability of 
these hospitals, but this effect was again only signifi- 
cant at RO.10. All other interaction terms in the not- 
for-profit system model failed to achieve statistical 
significance. It is notable that the interaction of 
investor ownership with system affiliation differs in 
direction both when comparing the investor-owned 
to the not-for-profit model. Affiliation with an 
investor-owned system increases survival probabili- 
ties of investor-owned hospitals, but affiliation with a 
not-for-profit system reduces survival probabilities 
for these same hospitals. 
In the contract management model, three interac- 
tion terms proved significant. The negative coefficient 
of the size interaction term suggests that rural 
hospitals increase their chances of survival under 
contract management under conditions of increasing 
size (RO.10). However, declining and unstable 
hospitals experienced reduced survival probabilities 
when affiliating with systems under contract man- 
agement arrangements. This contrasts with the 
pattern of results in the investor-owned model in 
which decliners might improve their survival chances 
if affiliating with an investor-owned system. 
In general, the pattern of findings indicates that 
the effects of system affiliation strategies on hospital 
survival are, in some cases, conditioned by type of 
hospital that affiliates, performance stage at the time 
of affiliation, and type of affiliation strategy pursued 
by the rural hospital. While these interaction-based 
findings do not obviate the results of the main effects 
model, they do suggest system affiliation may be 
preferred under some conditions and eschewed 
under others as rural hospitals consider strategies for 
survival. 
Selection Into Multihospital Systems. An 
enduring theme of the literature on multihospital 
system performance is the issue of selection bias 
(Ermann & Gabel, 1984). For example, rural hospitals 
joining a multihospital system, or a particular type of 
multihospital system, may be significantly different 
in terms of survival potential than hospitals that do 
not join systems. The observed impact of system 
affiliation on hospital survival would therefore 
merely be a proxy for the underlying differences 
between joiners and non-joiners. Previous studies 
have recognized such selection as a potential prob- 
lem, but have done little to address it. Mullner et al. 
(1989), for example, reported that hospitals with a 
more favorable financial status may be more likely to 
join (or to be accepted by) multihospital systems and, 
therefore, less likely to close. Similarly, Barry, Tucker, 
and Seavey (1990) found that multihospital system- 
affiliated hospitals were more likely to be located in 
areas with high population growth rates and less 
competition (as measured by hospital beds per 1,000 
population) as compared to independent hospitals. 
To address the selection bias issue, we compared 
performance characteristics of hospitals in the study 
panel that did or did not affiliate with multihospital 
systems. These characteristics included measures of 
long-term performance stage and 1983 operating 
margin. Table 5 presents the results of these perfor- 
mance comparisons. 
Rural hospitals that joined investor-owned 
systems were significantly more likely than non- 
joiners to be in a declining performance stage and 
significantly less likely to be experiencing unstable 
performance relative to non-joiners. The operating 
margins of rural hospitals affiliating with investor- 
owned systems tended to be significantly lower than 
those of rural hospitals that did not affiliate with 
these systems. In general, these results suggest that 
investor-owned systems were more likely to pur- 
chase hospitals with poorer performance characteris- 
tics, indicating a degree of systematic selection into 
these systems on the basis of such performance. 
No significant differences between joiners and 
non-joiners of not-for-profit systems were observed. 
This suggests that self-selection, either on the basis of 
low or high performance, does not operate in rural 
hospital affiliation with not-for-profit systems in the 
post-PPS era. Finally, hospitals affiliating under 
contract management arrangements with systems 
tended to be more unstable in their performance than 
non-contract management hospitals during the study 
period. No differences, however, were observed in 
operating margins between those rural hospitals 
affiliating under contract management versus those 
that did not engage in such strategies. 
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Table 5. Performance Comparisons of Hospitals 
Affiliating and Not Affiliating with 
Multihospital Systems (1983 to 198811. 
Investor Contract 
Owned Not-for-profit Management 
Performance No Yes No Yes No Yes 
characteristic 
Percent decliner 5.75 11.63**2 5.92 7.84 6.18 4.89 
stage 
Percent grower 6.44 5.43 6.35 7.19 6.43 6.12 
stage 
Percent stable 34.12 37.98 34.60 29.41 34.95 29.66* 
stage 
Percent 53.69 44.96* 53.13 55.56 52.44 59.33* 
unstable stage 
Mean 0.026 0.007* 0.026 0.015 0.026 0.020 
operating3 
margin 
1. Comparisons made between hospital groups that either did 
(yes) or did not (no) engage in specific type of multihospital 
system affiliation during the study period (1983 to 1988). 
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: 
* P<O.O5 
** P<O.Ol 
Statistical significance was determined by Fisher‘s Test (one 
tailed) for performance cycle variables and by t test for 
operating margin. 
Mean 1983 operating margin ws calculated as (total 1983 




We proposed in this investigation that the risk of 
rural hospital closure would be greater for hospitals 
joining investor-owned systems, smaller for hospitals 
joining not-for-profit systems, and essentially un- 
changed by affiliating with a contract management 
system. Our results show that regardless of system 
type, system membership is not an effective strategy 
for rural hospitals to reduce closure odds. Affiliation 
with not-for-profit systems and contract management 
arrangements has no significant impact on the likeli- 
hood of closure, and affiliation with investor-owned 
systems actually increases the likelihood of closure. 
These results describe the efficacy of system 
affiliation within the rural hospital sector following 
the implementation of Medicare’s PPS (post-1 983). 
We also examined, however, whether or not rural 
hospitals that had joined systems prior to 1983 
improved their survival chances in the post-PPS era. 
Although not statistically significant, the effect of 
earlier system affiliation on the hazard of closure was 
negative across all three types of systems examined 
here, i.e., closure was somewhat less likely for early 
system joiners. This may be interpreted as evidence 
that the strategic value of system affiliation in rural 
areas has itself changed as a result of PPS. Early 
system joiners may have reaped the alleged benefits 
of cost savings and improved access to capital 
markets. Whether the profile of early joiners has 
changed as well cannot be ascertained with our data. 
Post-PPS system joiners in rural areas do not appear 
to be significantly different from nonjoiners of not- 
for-profit or contract management systems, although 
rural hospitals joining investor-owned systems do 
seem to be generally poorer performers. It may be, 
however, that system affiliation in the post-PI’S era is 
now part of the general “downward spiral” of the 
rural hospital industry (Hambrick & DAveni, 1988), 
and once the spiral starts, not even extraordinary 
measures can necessarily stop its course. Clearly, 
however, a much longer time series is needed to 
adequately compare pre- and post-PI‘S system 
affiliation strategic value. 
the hospital’s or the system’s-when a hospital 
affiliates with a system cannot be answered by these 
analyses. In any given affiliation, a complex balance 
of negotiations and bargains are struck by both the 
subject hospital and the interested system. Whether 
the hospital approaches the system first or the system 
targets the hospital cannot be captured by secondary 
data such as these from the Annual Survey of Hospi- 
tals. Nonetheless, we examined possible patterns of 
“selection” characteristics, specifically performance 
indicators of rural hospitals that did and did not join 
systems between 1984 and 1988. These analyses 
revealed significant differences primarily between 
hospitals that did and did not join investor-owned 
systems during the study period. In general, rural 
hospitals joining (or being purchased by) investor- 
owned systems were poor performers. A number of 
different possibilities may explain this ”selection” 
effect. It may be that investor-owned systems rou- 
tinely focus on hospitals with records as poor per- 
formers, perhaps as a way of targeting possible 
“bargains” for takeover. It is also possible that 
The question of whose strategy is implemented- 
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investor-owned systems are more likely to pursue 
growth (i.e., takeovers) for growth’s sake, thus 
extending their systems to pick up both solid and 
poor performers, particularly in rural areas where a 
number of possible ”targets” can easily be found. 
Alternatively, investor-owned systems may be more 
likely to purchase declining hospitals if they are 
particularly confident of their management strategies 
and their ability to turn decliners into stable or 
growing concerns. Obviously, however, the utility of 
these explanations must be evaluated in future 
research on system affiliation in rural areas. 
system affiliation a reasonable strategy for rural 
hospitals, even though the “safety-net effect” of 
system affiliation in the post-PPS era is not to be 
found? Hospital closure is influenced both by hospi- 
tal operating characteristics (Government Accouting 
Office, 1990b) and strategic management activity 
(Ermann, 1990). However, as discussed by Mick and 
Morlock (1990), the “causal connection between 
factors correlated with closure is unclear.” To under- 
stand factors influencing closure of rural hospitals, it 
may be important to examine strategic options 
employed by rural hospitals under certain operating 
conditions. Again, in our main effects model we 
obtained statistically significant results primarily for 
hospitals joining investor-owned systems. In brief, 
affiliation with investor-owned systems increases the 
chances of closure for rural hospitals, and this result 
is statistically significant even when controlling for 
the effect of hospital performance. Given the impor- 
tance of bottom-line considerations for investor- 
owned systems, it may be that such systems are more 
likely to close down unprofitable or marginally 
profitable hospitals, or perhaps to do so more 
quickly, compared to other types of systems. The 
influence of not-for-profit affiliation or contract 
management on hospital closure was not significant. 
The influence of system affiliation on rural 
hospital closure may be somewhat modified, how- 
ever, by both hospital ownership and size. Investor- 
owned rural hospitals that have affiliated with 
investor-owned systems are somewhat less likely to 
close; however, affiliation with not-for-profit systems 
by investor-owned hospitals seems to increase the 
risk of closure. This would suggest a ”homophily- 
like” effect in the for-profit sector, where the transi- 
tion from freestanding to investor-owned system 
hospital is more easily traversed by investor-owned 
hospitals. Larger hospitals joining investor-owned 
systems, however, are at greater risk of closure. 
Investor-owned systems may be less capable of 
Finally, under what conditions is multihospital 
rescuing larger rural hospitals, but the range of 
hospital sizes usually found in rural communities 
tends to be smaller than the national range: hospitals 
with about 200 beds in rural areas are considered 
fairly large. Nonetheless, it may be that investor- 
owned system affiliation is a reasonable strategy for a 
rather limited group of hospitals in rural areas: small 
investor-owned hospitals. 
For whatever reasons rural hospitals seek 
multihospital system affiliation, or systems seek to 
acquire rural hospitals, these analyses show that the 
link between system affiliation and rural hospital 
closure in the post-PPS era is grimmer than most 
industry observers have previously thought. Closure 
is not made less likely by affiliation with either not- 
for-profit systems or contract management arrange- 
ments, and is actually more likely following affilia- 
tion with investor-owned systems. Given the fact that 
these results control for a variety of possible predis- 
posing characteristics that may influence system 
affiliation effects on closure, and that the study 
examines closure during a six-year period, the 
findings appear fairly robust. 
cerns the definition of closure employed as our 
dependent variable. It is important to reiterate that 
closure need not entail a complete cessation of 
operations as an organization, but may encompass 
conversion to a non-hospital health care facility. This 
means that “survival,” in the context of the current 
analysis, should be viewed as survival for the hospi- 
tal as an inpatient, acute care delivery organization. 
For example, investor-owned systems, as a part of 
their corporate strategy, may convert acquired acute 
care facilities to long-term care facilities or nursing 
homes. Greater access to capital and management 
expertise may facilitate such conversions among 
hospitals participating in multihospital systems. For 
purposes of the current study, it is necessary to 
emphasize again that non-survival of a rural hospital 
does not necessarily equate with absence of a health 
care presence in rural communities. 
The research questions addressed in this investi- 
gation were centered on the effects of affiliating or 
not affiliating with a multihospital system. Whereas 
this issue has clear relevance for hospital decision- 
makers, there are other important questions that 
remain to be answered. For example, a competing 
risk analysis might be undertaken to answer the 
question of how affiliation with one type of system 
affects survival chances relative to other strategic 
options. The data requirements for such analyses are 
exceedingly complex. Yet, the notion of competing 
An important caveat of the current study con- 
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risks based on an assessment of the relative efficacy 
of alternative strategies may be a more realistic (and 
ultimately more useful) approach given the choices 
faced by decision makers in many rural hospitals. For 
example, rural hospital management and trustees 
often simultaneously deliberate on whether or not to 
join a non-profit multihospital system, enter into a 
contract management arrangement with an investor- 
owned system, or engage in diversification by 
starting a long-term care facility. The central concern 
for these decision makers would be the relative 
benefits these alternative strategies hold for institu- 
tional viability and survival. 
Notes - 
Hospitals with missing data for sole provider status or 
performance state were eliminated from the study population. 
There exists a small probability that a hospital may experience 
more than one system affiliation during the study period. 
Nationally, the rate of multiple strategic events during a nine- 
year (1980-1988) period is quite low, about 4 percent. This 
includes both repeated events, such as one hospital experienc- 
ing both a system affiliation and a corporate restructure. A 
closer examination of those cases where more than one 
system affiliation event occurred during the nine-year period 
revealed that most of those were hospitals reporting affiliation 
with a system for two consecutive years; in other words, these 
were singular events unfolding during a two-year period. 
We were unable to examine certain potential moderating 
effects, as these represented an empty set, i.e. no hospital in 
the study panel had religious ownership, joined a not-for- 
profit system, or closed during the study period. Thus, values 
for these moderating effects are left blank. 
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